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To improve the efficiency of the closing price, many equity
exchanges apply volatility extensions to their closing call
auctions (CCAs). If an imminent auction execution implies a
large price change, the order submission period is extended
to let traders reconsider their orders. This paper uses the
introduction of closing auction volatility extensions at NAS-
DAQ Nordic to provide the first analysis of the effects of
such mechanisms. We find that the volatility extensions
reduce transitory volatility and deter price manipulation at
the close. Consistent with increased trust in the mechanism,
the CCA attracts higher volumes after the change.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The last price of the day is increasingly important in financial markets. Because it is used for index calculations, deriva-
tives settlement, and portfolio performance evaluation, the closing price has implications beyond the security traded.
The widespread use of the closing price makes the market close an increasingly popular trading opportunity, as man-
agers of passive index-tracking products (e.g., exchange-traded funds) want to minimize tracking errors, and holders
and issuers of derivatives seek to hedge their bets. Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) show that these flows can
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lead to large imbalances at the close. Furthermore, the role as benchmark makes the closing price a target for manip-
ulation (Hillion & Suominen, 2004; Madhavan & Panchapagesan, 2000). As envisioned by Economides and Schwartz
(1995), most exchanges now rely on a closing call auction (CCA) to determine an efficient closing price. The aim of this
paper is to analyze the effects of CCA volatility extensions, a feature that protects the auction mechanism from large
and potentially inefficient price changes.
The volatility extension is built to mitigate transitory volatility in the call auction price. A call auction typically con-
sists of twophases: the order entry phase (also known as the batching period), inwhich orders are entered but no trad-
ing takes place, and the uncross, in which the trade price and volume are determined at the intersection of supply and
demand. Under a volatility extension regime, the order entry phase is prolonged if the imminent uncross price violates
preset price limits, which are known as volatility bands. Similar to circuit breakers in continuous trading, a volatility
extension signals to investors that volatility is unusually high and allows them to reconsider their orders. Although cir-
cuit breakers are ubiquitous in equity markets and have been thoroughly analyzed in the literature, this paper is the
first to analyze the effects of volatility extensions.
We use a quasi-natural experiment to evaluate the effects of CCA extensions. On December 1, 2014, the NAS-
DAQ Nordic equity market introduced a volatility extension in the CCAs of the Stockholm segment of their market.
TheCopenhagen andHelsinki segments of NASDAQNordic, which operate undermarket structure conditions almost
identical to those of the Stockholm market, were unaffected by the change. They serve as a suitable control group in
our analyses.1
Our sample consists of relatively small stocks. NASDAQ Nordic is at the time of our sample the eighth largest
exchange in Europe, and most of our analysis is done on its mid-cap and small-cap segments. As thinly traded stocks
aremore susceptible to both fundamental volatility and closing pricemanipulation (Aggarwal &Wu, 2006; Comerton-
Forde & Putnin, š, 2014), this is exactly the type of securities in which CCA extensions are potentially most useful.
In addition to the important role of closing prices discussed above, our study is motivated by current develop-
ments in the EuropeanUnion and in the United States. In the EuropeanUnion, since 2018, all regulated exchanges are
required to apply volatility curbs in continuous trading as well as in call auctions.2 In the United States, the efficiency
of CCA prices are questioned by recent studies by Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) and Hu and Murphy (2020).
The importance of theCCAprice efficiency is leveraged by the increasing trading interest at the close. CCAvolumes in
USmarkets climbed fromabout 3%of the average daily volume in 2011 to 8% in 2019,whereas in the EuropeanUnion
it reached 25%, up from 15% in 2016.3
We find that the volatility extension improves the closing price efficiency in small-cap andmid-cap stocks. The inci-
dence of extraordinary closing price volatility (as defined by NASDAQNordic) is reduced, and the closing price transi-
tory volatility falls significantly, relative to the control group. For large-cap stocks, we find that the closingmechanism
functionswell bothwith andwithout the volatility extension. Accordingly, we focus our analysis on small- andmid-cap
stocks.
Apotential reason for thedrop in transitory volatility at the close is that the volatility extensiondetersmanipulative
behavior. Tomislead other auction participants,manipulators often either submit or cancel large orders during the last
few seconds of the auction. We develop two proxies of such strategies and find statistically significant reductions in
both. Though we acknowledge that manipulative strategies are inherently difficult to capture, we view these results
as evidence of improved integrity.
1 According to personal communications with NASDAQNordic, the exclusion of Copenhagen andHelsinki from the CCA volatility extensionmechanismwas
due to agreements with local stakeholders and is unrelated to themarket quality variables of interest in this paper.
2 Specifically, Article 48, §5, of the secondMarkets in Financial InstrumentsDirective (MiFID II), effective since January3, reads: “Member States shall require
a regulated market to be able to temporarily halt or constrain trading if there is a significant price movement in a financial instrument on that market or
a related market” (https://www.esma.europa.eu/databases-library/interactive-single-rulebook/clone-mifid-ii/article-48). The MiFID II guidelines on circuit
breakers and trading halts further specify that trading halts include “mechanisms that extend the period of scheduled or unscheduled call auctions” (https:
//www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma70-872942901-63_mifid_ii_guidelines_on_trading_halts.pdf).
3 See TABB Forum, April 9, 2019, After Hours: The Rise in Europe’s Closing Auctions. https://research.tabbgroup.com/report/v17-021-after-hours-rise-
europes-closing-auctions
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Finally, we document that the volatility extension triggers investors to redistribute their trading from the continu-
ous trading session to the CCA. Furthermore, a greater portion of the auction trading volume is due to orders submit-
ted at the beginning of the batching period, and the auction indicative price is less volatile and is established earlier in
the batching period. Our interpretation of these patterns is that investor confidence in theCCAmechanism is boosted
by the volatility extension, potentially due to a reduction of manipulative strategies.
Our study contributes to several strands of the literature. Several empirical studies document how CCAs can help
to improve the efficiency of the closing price (Schwartz, 2001) and overcome order imbalances and information asym-
metries at the end of the trading day (Aitken et al., 2005; Barclay et al., 2008; Economides, & Schwartz, 1995; Kandel
et al., 2012; Madhavan, 1992; Pagano & Schwartz, 2003). We contribute by analyzing how volatility extensions influ-
ence the CCA quality.We also introduce newmeasures of batching periodmarket quality and highlight the role of call
auctionmarket integrity.
We also contribute to the emerging literature on call auction design. Economides and Schwartz (1995) note that
auction design is important to improve the efficiency of closing prices, and empirical studies by McCormick (2001),
Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006), Kandel et al. (2012), and Lin et al. (2019) follow in this vein. Dyhrberg et al. (2019)
analyze the effects that the CCA and its design have on market liquidity and efficiency in 43 exchanges worldwide.
They consider volatility curbs, but they do not distinguish volatility extensions from other approaches to curb closing
price volatility (e.g., price collars andmanual interventions; see Section 2). Our study is also more granular than theirs
in that we analyze the order entry phase activity, which helps us to understand the economic channels of the effects
observed.
Finally, our study relates to the literature on volatility curbs andextends it to the auction setting. Previous studies in
this field focus on price limits and circuit breakers in continuous trading (for literature reviews, see Kim & Yang, 2004
andHarris, 1998).We contribute to the literature by analyzingwhether volatility extensions increasemarket integrity
and investors’ trust in the auctionmechanism.
2 CALL AUCTION VOLATILITY CURBS AROUND THE WORLD
Table 1 presents an overview of call auction volatility curbs implemented at major equity exchanges around the world
as of December 2019.
There are two types of volatility curbs: the volatility extension4 and the price collar. Similar to the volatility exten-
sion, the price collar applies preset volatility bands. However, if the equilibrium price falls outside the price limits,
the auction trade is not delayed but executed at the price limit. Although the volatility extension is the most common
volatility curb at EU exchanges and the subject of our empirical investigation, the price collar is common in the US
equity markets.
The length of the auction extensions varies from1min (at theOslo Børs) to 10min (at the Toronto Stock Exchange),
and the number of extensions can be either one (most common) or two (the London Stock Exchange and the Tel Aviv
Stock Exchange).
In the US equity markets, the NYSE, NYSE Arca, and NASDAQ all operate price collars for the opening call auction
aswell as for the reopening auction following trading halts. NYSEArca applies price collars for the closing auction too,
whereas NASDAQ uses a volatility extension. At the NYSE, under unusual market conditions, the designated market
maker may arbitrarily delay the auction execution. For the reopening of markets following trading halts, which by def-
inition occur at times of high volatility, the US exchanges harmonized their procedures in 2017. In accordance with
4 Although call auction volatility extensions are used at exchanges around the world, there is no consensus on the terminology. For example, NASDAQ
Nordic and NASDAQ Baltic calls them auction safeguards (https://bit.ly/2JKWc6B), the London Stock Exchange names them price monitoring extensions
(https://www.lseg.com/documents/guide-new-trading-system-doc) and in the United States, NASDAQ uses the term auction time extensions (http://www.
nasdaqtrader.com/content/NewsAlerts/2017/LULD_12_Sheet.pdf).
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TABLE 1 Call auction volatility curbs around the world
Exchange Type of volatility curb Call auction session
Europe
Borsa Istanbul (None)
Euronext (Lisbon, Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris,
London)
Price collar Open, close
London Stock Exchange Vol. extension (twice, 5min)a Open, intraday, close
NASDAQBaltics Vol. extension (once, 3min) Open, close
NASDAQCopenhagen andHelsinki Vol. extension (once, 3min) Open
NASDAQ Stockholm and Iceland Vol. extension (once, 3min) Open, reopen, close
Oslo Børs Vol. extension (once, 1min) Open, reopen, close
Spanish Stock Exchange Vol. extension (once, 2min) Open, close
SIX Swiss Exchange (None) –
Xetra Vol. extension (once, flexible dur.) Open, close
Italian Bourse Vol. extension (once, 2min)b Open, close
Americas
NASDAQ Price collar Open, reopen
Vol. extension (1-min increments)c Close
NYSE Price collar Open, reopen
Vol. extensiond Open, reopen, close
NYSE Arca Price collar Open, reopen, close
Toronto Stock Exchange Vol. extension (once, 10min) Close
B3—Brazil Stock Exchange Vol. extension (once, up to 5min) Close
Asia
Hong Kong Stock Exchange Price collar Open, reopen, close
Moscow Exchange Vol. extension (once, 3min) Close
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange Vol. extension (twice, 3−4min)e Open, close
Africa
Johannesburg Stock Exchange Vol. extension (once, 5min) Open, intraday, close
aIf the hypothetical execution price after the first auction extension still lies outside the predefined price bands, a second
extension is triggered.
bFor the opening auction, if the hypothetical execution price after the first extension still lies outside the predefined price
bands, a second extension is triggered.
cThere is no limit on the number of extensions. The closing auction is extended successively if, after each 1-min extension,
there is a market order imbalance or if the indicative price moves by more than 5% or USD 0.50 (whichever is greater) in the
last 15 s of the batching period.
dThere are no preset rules on the range of deviation or the length of the auction extension. The extension is triggered at the
discretion of the designated market maker under unusual market conditions and when order imbalances could cause large
price dislocations.
eIf the hypothetical execution price after the first auction extension still lies outside the predefined price bands, a second
extension is triggered.
The table presents information about call auction volatility curbs around the world as of December 2019. The authors are
thankful to Sean Foley for providing information on the closing mechanisms and call auction designs of numerous exchanges
around the world.
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the exchanges’ joint filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (2016), the reopening auctions should be
extended if the auction equilibrium price violates preset volatility bands or if there is a market order imbalance. The
auction should then be extended by 5-min increments with gradually increasing volatility bands until the uncross can
take place.5
3 THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
To our knowledge, there is no theoretical work on volatility curbs specific to the call auction setting. Hence, we use the
literature on circuit breakers as our starting point for formulating hypotheses on the effects of CCA extensions.
To assess the merit of volatility curbs, it is important to distinguish between fundamental and transitory volatility
(Fama, 1989; Greenwald & Stein, 1991; Harris, 1998). Fundamental volatility contributes to price discovery, whereas
transitory volatility may be due to the order imbalances of uninformed traders, transaction costs, or price manipula-
tion. Just like a circuit breaker in continuous trading, an auction extension can mitigate transitory volatility in the call
auction by offering a period of relief during which traders can reconsider their orders.
Volatility curbs are aimed to mitigate transitory volatility, but they may also delay price discovery (see Kim & Yang,
2004). This reasoning carries over to the call auction setting although the delay is limited to the length of the volatility
extension.6
Based on this discussion, we formulate our first hypothesis.
H1: The introduction of a CCA volatility extension improves the efficiency of the closing price by reducing the transitory
volatility.
To understand the channels of an improvement in closing price efficiency, we now consider how a CCA volatility
extension can influence the incentives of market participants and formulate hypotheses related to market integrity
and auction attractiveness.
Market integrity is a key priority in the design of the closing price mechanism. Hillion and Suominen (2004) point
out that, if appropriate safeguards are not in place, the closing pricemay be subject tomanipulative strategies. Though
the use of a call auction generally diminishes the scope for price manipulation, Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000)
show that prices may still be distorted if the auction order flow is thin and the order imbalance is high. Comerton-
Forde and Rydge (2006) present empirical evidence showing that the call auction design (degree of transparency and
matching algorithm design) can improve the efficiency of the closing price.
A trigger of the CCA extension signals to market participants that there is an extraordinary amount of volatility in
the auction.Wepredict that (the threat of) such an alarmbell detersmanipulative strategies and thus improvesmarket
integrity.
H2: The introduction of a volatility extension improves the integrity of the CCAmechanism.
Economides and Schwartz (1995) argue that call auctions are good for market efficiency because they consoli-
date the order flow in time and space. Accordingly, policy makers should design call auctions to incentivize traders to
5 For examples of the new rules for reopening call auctions, see https://www.nyse.com/network/article/nyse-increases-resiliancy-during-extreme-volatility
and http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/content/NewsAlerts/2017/LULD_12_Sheet.pdf
6 Two aspects of circuit breakers that do not apply to auction extensions are volatility spillovers (see Lehmann, 1989) and themagnet effect (Subrahmanyam,
1994). Volatility spillovers can happen when price limits are narrowly set. In the call auction setting, this can apply for price collars. For volatility extensions,
in contrast, the auction uncross price is delayed but not constrained. The magnet effect of circuit breakers can emerge when the traded price is close to the
volatility bands. Traders who fear that trading will be ceased may amplify volatility by trading more aggressively. In a call auction setting with a volatility
extension, aggressive orders do not lead to earlier execution.
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participate. As manipulation discourages investor participation (Comerton-Forde & Putnin, š, 2014), alleviating such
strategies can improve auction attractiveness.
Domowitz and Madhavan (2001) argue that call auction participants value the possibility of cancelling and modi-
fying orders during the batching period. The CCA volatility extension allows them to reconsider their orders at times
of turbulence.We expect this signal to reduce the auctionmonitoring costs, making themechanismmore attractive to
market participants.
H3: The introduction of a volatility extension improves the attractiveness of the CCAmechanism.
4 EMPIRICAL SETTING AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
4.1 CCA volatility extensions at NASDAQ Nordic
NASDAQNordic is the eighth largest stock exchange in Europe (based on turnover statistics for November 2014; see
the Federation of European Securities Exchanges, 2014) and the primary venue for most Danish, Finnish, Icelandic,
and Swedish equities. The trading system INET is also used for NASDAQ in the United States.
The NASDAQ Nordic continuous limit order book market is open on weekdays from 9:00 a.m. to 5:25 p.m.,
except for Copenhagen listings, which close at 4:55 p.m.7 On trading days before public holidays, the closing time is
12:55 p.m.8
4.1.1 CCAs at NASDAQ Nordic
The CCA order entry phase starts and runs for 5 min immediately after the continuous trading ends. Standard orders
resting in the continuous limit order book are then transferred to the auction order book. During the batching period,
limit andmarket orders can be entered, modified, and cancelled at any time.
At the uncross, which is at 5:30 p.m. for the Stockholm andHelsinki segments and at 5:00 p.m. for the Copenhagen
segment, trading takes place if there are orders to buy and sell at crossed or equal prices. The closing price is set at the
level thatmaximizes theauction tradingvolume.Auctionorders areexecuted in accordance toprice-internal-visibility-
time priority.9
During the CCA, the trading system disseminates, in real time, the prices and depth at the best bid and ask levels,
indicative closing information, and imbalance information. Indicative closing information refers to the closingprice and
volume that would result if the current limit order book status were to prevail at the time of the uncross. Imbalance
information is the volume and direction of orders that would not be executed if the current status were to prevail at
the uncross.
7 Stockholm and Copenhagen follow Central European time (UTC+ 1) and Helsinki follows Eastern European time (UTC+ 2). The Helsinki segment opening
hours overlap perfectly with those of the Stockholm segment. However, stated in local time, the Helsinki segment is open between 10:00 a.m. and 6:25 p.m.
In all subsequent references to time, we use UTC+ 1.
8 For the technical details presented here, see the INETmarketmodel, which holds complete information about themarket structure ofNASDAQNordic. The
document is available at: http://www.nasdaqomx.com/digitalAssets/90/90375_nasdaq-omx-nordic-market-model-2.23.pdf
9 Internal priority means that orders with price priority that are posted by the same exchange member on different sides of the trade (e.g., on behalf
of different clients) are executed against each other, regardless of their visibility and time priority. The same priority rules apply for continuous
trading.
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4.1.2 The volatility extension
NASDAQNordic introduced volatility extensions on December 1, 2014. In addition to the CCA of the Stockholm seg-
ment, the volatility extensionwas introduced in the opening call auctions of the Stockholm, Copenhagen, andHelsinki
listings.10
The volatility extension is triggered if the uncross price deviation from the reference price, defined as the price
of the last trade in the continuous trading session, exceeds the volatility bands. The volatility extension prolongs the
batching period by 3 min. At the end of the extension, the uncross takes place regardless of what the equilibrium
price is.
The volatility bands are typically set at ±5% of the reference price. The volatility bands are tighter for stocks that
are part of the large-cap indexes (OMXS30 for Stockholm, OMXH25 for Helsinki, and OMXC20 for Copenhagen) and
wider for penny shares and certain illiquid stocks.11
4.2 Data and sample
We access tick-by-tick data on trades, quotes, and auction uncross information from the Tick History database, main-
tained by Refinitiv. The data are time-stamped to the microsecond. The trade data include prices, volumes, and quali-
fiers indicatingwhether a trade is executed in the auction or in the continuous limit order book. The quote data include
order book information such as the aggregate order volumes available at each price level. Specific to the auctionmech-
anism, Tick History reports the indicative uncross information and the imbalance information during the batching
period as well as uncross information at the end of the auction. The prices and volumes disseminated in the indica-
tive uncross information are denoted Indicative Price and Indicative Volume, respectively. The corresponding variables
for the actual auction uncross are denoted Closing Price and Closing Volume. Order Imbalance stands for the imbalance
information (defined as above).
Our sample includes large-, mid-, and small-cap stocks listed at NASDAQ Nordic.12 We retain stocks that remain
in the same size segment throughout the entire sample period and that have trading activity for all the months of the
sample. In total, 546 of 586 stocks are included in the sample (285 listed in Stockholm, 125 in Helsinki, and 136 in
Copenhagen). We include data from 6 months before to 6 months after the event, implying a pre-event period from
June 1, 2014 to November 30, 2014, and a post-event period fromDecember 1, 2014 toMay 31, 2015.
4.3 Market characteristics
Table 2 reports the characteristics of the markets that we study based on 6 months preceding the introduction of the
extensions. As expected, the trading volume of stocks at NASDAQNordic increases withmarket capitalization. Large-
caps also have a higher proportion of their volume in the CCA (≃15% for the treatment group and 12% for the control
10 NASDAQ Nordic refers to the extensions as auction safeguards. The technical details and scope regarding the introduction of CCA extensions are based
on official NASDAQ documents available at https://bit.ly/2WUSri2 and http://www.nasdaqomx.com/digitalAssets/95/95742_q-a-auction-safeguards-and-
extension-nov-2014.pdf. NASDAQ Nordic also includes the Reykjavik listings, where both the opening and closing auctions are subject to extensions. We
exclude the Reykjavik segment because the volatility bands are determined differently from the other segments. Outside NASDAQ Nordic, the volatility
extensions were introduced at the same time as for NASDAQ Baltic (including the Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius listings) and First North (a NASDAQ-operated
venue for growth companies in Europe) for both the opening and closing auctions.
11 Exchanges often maintain some degree of discretion over when an extension should be applied. We validate the official parameters by evaluating actual
volatility extensions in our data set and find that they are almost perfectly consistentwith the published thresholds.Details and examples onhow the volatility
bands are applied and howwe identify them in the data are given in Section A of the Appendix in the Supporting Information.
12 The capitalization categories are defined by the exchange and do notmap directly to other definitions. For example, virtually all mid-caps in our sample are
valued at less thanUSD2 billion, whichwouldmake them small-caps according toUS terminology. Our large-cap category is, according toUS standards, amix
of mid-caps and large-caps.
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F IGURE 1 Extraordinary closing price volatility. This figure shows the incidence of Extraordinary Closing Price
Volatility before and after the introduction of CCA extensions. The bar chart reports the number of different
stock-days where the price change from the end of the continuous trading session to the end of the CCA is large
enough to fulfil the conditions for an auction extension. The results are reported for both the pre- and post-event
periods for eachmarket capitalization segment (small-cap, mid-cap, and large-cap) and for the treatment group
(NASDAQ Stockholm) as well as the control group (NASDAQCopenhagen andHelsinki). The pre-event period (Pre)
contains all trading days from June 1 to November 30, 2014. The post-event period (Post) contains all trading days
fromDecember 1, 2014 toMay 31, 2015
group) thanmid-caps (≃6%and7% for the treatment and control groups, respectively) and small-caps (2% for both the
treatment and control groups). The lowerCCAvolumes for small- andmid-cap stocks suggest that they are likely to be
more sensitive to order imbalances, increasing the likelihood of mispricing or manipulation.
An important observation that can be made from Table 2 is that our treatment group (NASDAQ Stockholm) is, in
many respects, similar to the control group (NASDAQHelsinki andNASDAQCopenhagen). There are285 stocks in the
treatment group compared to 261 in the control group. The averagemarket capitalization is around EUR 1.9 billion in
the treatment group and aroundEUR1.5 billion in the control group.13 The average relative quoted spread and volatil-
ity is also comparable across the different size segments of the treatment and control groups. Finally, the tendency of
a lower CCA volume in smaller stocks is reflected in both groups.
4.4 Extraordinary closing price volatility
To obtain a preliminary view of the effects of the CCA extension, we calculate the incidence of Extraordinary Closing
Price Volatility. Specifically, we form a binary variable indicating for each stock-day whether the CCA volatility bands
are violated. For the treatment group post-event period, this count equals the incidence of CCA extensions. For other
stock-days, we use the volatility bands described in Section A of the Appendix in the Supporting Information to detect
hypothetical triggers. We define hypothetical triggers as price changes that would have caused an extension, had the
CCA extension been in operation.
Figure 1 shows the number of stock-days featuring Extraordinary Closing Price Volatility. The bars are grouped by
stock segments as classified by NASDAQNordic, treatment and control markets, and the periods before and after the
event.
13 We note that the maximummarket capitalization for the small-caps (mid-caps) in each geographic segment exceeds the minimum of the mid-caps (large-
caps) in the same segment. These observations are not data errors, but due to the exchange’s categorization of stocks being done periodically. That is, the
market capitalizations reported in the table are not the same as those used for the categorization.
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After the introduction of theCCA volatility extension, Extraordinary Closing Price Volatilitydrops in all size segments
for the treatment stocks. Note that this result is not mechanical because we base the volatility measure on the sched-
uled closing time and not on the actual closing time if there is an extension. We find no corresponding reduction for
the control group, signaling that the decline in volatility is due to the introduction of the CCA extension.14
It is important to note that Extraordinary Closing Price Volatility is rare. Of 137,046 stock-days across stock seg-
ments andperiods, there are only 87 cases of such closing pricemovements. This low incidence is consistentwith other
volatility curbs and reflects the policy makers’ intention not to intervene in trading in anything but extreme instances.
It is well-known, however, that volatility curbs influence trader behavior also in anticipation of an intervention (see,
e.g., Hautsch &Horvath, 2019; Subrahmanyam, 1994).
Related to this, we note that the decline in Extraordinary Closing Price Volatility is concentrated in small- andmid-cap
stocks. The incidence almost halves in these segments, from 27 instances before the introduction of the extensions,
to 14 afterward. In the large-cap segment, there is only one hypothetical trigger in the period before the introduction
and none afterward. We interpret the low incidence of Extraordinary Closing Price Volatility in the large-cap segment
as that the closing mechanism functions well both before and after the change, which may be due to the high CCA
volumes reported for large-caps in Table 2. Given that volatility bands rarely affect the large-cap stocks, we focus our
subsequent analysis on the small- andmid-cap stocks.
We emphasize that the evidence presented here is preliminary. The reduction inClosing Price Extraordinary Volatility
in the treatment group is consistent with H1, but there are too few events to assess statistical significance. Further-
more, the analysis here does not account for marketwide changes in volume and volatility, and it does not separate
transitory shocks from fundamental volatility. In the next section, we outline a methodology that addresses all these
concerns.
5 METHODOLOGY
The fact that NASDAQ Nordic introduces a CCA volatility extension in one of its geographical segments while keep-
ing the other segments unaffected provides a quasi-natural experiment setup. Our identification of the effects of the
volatility extension on auction quality and attractiveness hinges on observed changes in the treatment group being
benchmarked to changes in the control group. The validity of this approach is leveraged by the fact that the treat-
ment and control groups otherwise operate under almost identical market structures and have similar characteristics
in terms of market capitalization and trading activity (as discussed in Subsection 4.3).
5.1 Difference-in-differences analysis
We employ a difference-in-differences regression model to assess the impact of the CCA volatility extension while
controlling for factors unrelated to the event. Specifically, to investigate the influence of the event on a variable Yi,t
(where i is an index for stocks and t is an index for trading days), we set up the following regressionmodel:
Yi,t = 𝛼 + 𝛽1Posti,t + 𝛽2Treatmenti,t + 𝛽3Posti,tTreatmenti,t + 𝛾Controlsi,t + 𝜀i,t , (1)
where Posti,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 for trading days in the post-event period (December 1, 2014 toMay 31,
2015) and Treatmenti,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 for stocks in the treatment group. The parameter of primary
interest is 𝛽3, which captures the effect of the introduction of a CCA extension in the treatment group relative to the
14 The result could potentially be driven by a large shock that induces high volatility in several stocks at the same time, or by a few stocks that repeatedly
trigger the extension. We find no support for such concerns. Instances of Closing Price Extraordinary Volatility are not clustered on a specific stock or day,
neither on days when derivatives contracts expire, nor at the end of a quarter or year. The instances are dispersed across stocks and time, and thus appear to
be idiosyncratic. For further details, see Section B of the Appendix in the Supporting Information.
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control group. Controlsi,t is a matrix of control variables, including Volatility and Volume, with Volatility computed as the
difference between the highest and lowest daily traded prices, divided by the average midpoint, and Volume as the
natural logarithm of the daily traded euro (EUR) volume.
5.2 Measures of closing price efficiency
To evaluateH1,which states that the volatility extension improves closing price efficiency, we analyze changes in tran-
sitory volatility at themarket close.
In the absence of transitory volatility, the variance of 24-h stock returns should be the same, regardless of the time
of daywhen the stock prices are sampled. This reasoning underlies several studies on themerits of opening and closing
price mechanisms, for example, Amihud andMendelson (1987). To assess changes in closing price transitory volatility
due to changes in the closing price mechanism, we consider the variance ratio of closing price returns and morning
price returns. A variance ratio greater than unity indicates that the transitory volatility in the closing price returns
exceeds that of themorning price returns.





















)) − 1, (2)
wherePClosei,t denotes theClosing Price, andP
Morning
i,t is theMorning Price.Wedefine the latter as either themidprice of the
bid–ask spread prevailing at 10:00 a.m., or as the volume-weighted average trade price from 9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.
The reason that we use prices from the continuous trading session rather than the opening auction price is to avoid
the influence of the introduction of volatility extensions in the opening auctions in both the control and the treatment
groups. The two alternative measures of the Morning Price address potential concerns that our results are driven by
the choice of benchmark price. We calculate the ETV for each stock i and each period j = [Pre, Post] , where Pre and
Post refer to the pre-event and post-event periods, respectively. The index t refers to trading days in the given period j.
To be included in the analysis of transitory volatility, we require a stock to have price observations for both the
Morning Price and the Closing Price in at least two-thirds of all trading days.15
5.3 Proxies of market integrity
Market integrity is an elusive concept that is difficult to quantify. Our strategy to identify changes in market integrity
is to analyze changes in trading and order activity that are consistent withmanipulative behavior.
How can the closing auction price be manipulated? Comerton-Forde and Putnin, š (2011) characterize closing price
manipulation in the continuous limit order book as aggressive trading with the purpose of moving the closing price
to an artificial level. The manipulative activity is typically concentrated to the last instances before the market close,
such that other participants have little time to respond. In the CCA setting, a manipulator has the same incentives
to concentrate the activity in the very end of the trading session, but the price distortion may be achieved through
aggressive order submissions and cancellations, rather than actual trading.
Our first proxy ofmanipulative closing auction behavior is designed to capture the following strategy. To achieve an
artificially high closing price, for example, a manipulator enters a large sell order in the batching period with the pur-
pose to create an impression of selling pressure. The large sell ordermay then trigger buy orders from other investors
15 Missing prices are due, at times, to the low levels of trading activity in illiquid stocks. Toobtain thedaily returns required tomeasureETV, webackfillmissing
prices. Specifically, a missingMorning Price is replaced by the previous Closing Price. If there is no Closing Price available from the auction, the last trade price of
the continuous session is used.
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who believe they will buy at a good price. Shortly before the auction uncross, the manipulator cancels the large sell
order. If the buyers do not follow suit before the uncross, the equilibrium price becomes artificially high. To capture
activities consistent with this strategy, we measure the rate of cancellations in the final 10 s of the batching period. If
the introduction of CCA extensions undermines this strategy, in line with H2, the late cancellations should decrease.
Specifically, we define the Late Cancellation Rate as:




where CancellationsLateCCA is the EUR value of orders that are cancelled during the final 10 s of the batching period. To
normalize the measure across stock-days, we divide by Closing Volume, defined as the EUR uncross volume. The vari-
ables in Equation (3), and all the following variables in this section, are observed on a stock-day frequency. For brevity,
the indexes i and t are omitted.
It is important to note that limit order cancellations are typically part of legitimate liquidity-demanding or market-
making strategies (e.g., Hasbrouck & Saar, 2009; van Kervel, 2015). But cancellations at the very end of the batching
period of a CCA may be associated with closing price manipulation. In particular, if there is a significant treatment
group reduction in the Late Cancellation Rate following the introduction of CCA extensions, relative to the control
group, we view this as evidence of increasingmarket integrity.
An alternative strategy for manipulating the CCA is to submit a large order at the end of the batching period. If
other traders do not have time to respond, it could push the equilibrium price to an artificial level. This strategy dif-
fers from the previous one in that it is likely to result in trades for the manipulator, whereas the former strategy does
not. A manipulator may be willing to go through with this strategy if the auction price is used for the valuation of a
related position, for example an option contract. We approximate the prevalence of such strategies by analyzing the
auction order imbalance, defined as the absolute volume of orders that would remain unexecuted if the order book is





where Order ImbalanceLateCCA is the average Order Imbalance of the last 10 s of the order entry phase, and
Order ImbalanceEarlyCCA is the averageOrder Imbalance of the preceding part of the batching period.
Weemphasize that order imbalance variations are typically unproblematic. But shocks in the very end of the batch-
ing period, potentially causing changes in the equilibrium price, may be due to price manipulation. We argue that a
reduction in Late Order Imbalance associated with the introduction of CCA extensions, seen in the treatment group
relative to the control group, indicates an increase inmarket integrity.
5.4 Proxies of auction attractiveness
The most straightforward way to assess whether the auction becomes more attractive is to investigate whether
traders migrate to or from the auctionmechanism.We define the Relative Closing Volume as:




16 The exchange disseminates the expected imbalance in real time tomarket participants during the batching period. The expectation is based on the assump-
tion that there are nomore submissions, cancellations, or modifications before the auction uncross.
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where Total Volume is the total stock-day trading volume, including the call auctions. We expect the
Relative Closing Volume to be increasing in auction attractiveness.
Another aspect of call auction attractiveness can be seen through the lens of investor activity during the CCA. For
example, if investors are not concerned about closing price volatility, they are more likely to submit orders early in
the batching period to gain time priority. If investors worry that the closing price is inefficient or that themarket lacks
integrity, in contrast, they may postpone their orders until the end. This point is akin to viewing limit orders as free
options that are offered to all market participants, with the limit price being the strike price (Copeland &Galai, 1983).
The value of such options is increasing in expected volatility, which thus deters traders to submit limit orders. Below,
we outline four proxies of auction attractiveness based on batching period activity.
The exchange disseminates the first indicative uncross information when there are crossing prices in the call auc-
tion limit order book.We denote the time of the first indicative uncross information as tfirst indicative, and the scheduled
uncross time (in the absence of a volatility extension) as tuncross. We then define:
First Indicative Time toUncross = tuncross − tfirst indicative, (6)
where time is measured in seconds. We argue that a higher value of First Indicative Time to Uncross signals higher auc-
tion attractiveness, because it demonstrates that investors trust the auctionmechanism enough to commit their trad-
ing interests early on.
Increasing trust in the auction can also be demonstrated by market participants posting larger orders early in the
batching period. To capture this dimension of trust, we let tindicative volume denote the first time when the Indicative Vol-
ume equals or exceeds the subsequent Closing Volume. Similar to the previous proxy, we define:
Indicative Volume Time toUncross = tuncross − tindicative volume, (7)
where time ismeasured in seconds. By the same reasoning as above, we expect the Indicative Volume Time toUncross to
be increasing with auction attractiveness.
An alternative way to evaluate trust in the auction mechanism is to measure the proportion of the Closing Volume
that is generated by orders posted early in the batching period. To this end, we define:




First Indicative Time toUncross
300
, (8)
where the first term is the ratio of theFirst IndicativeVolume (the IndicativeVolumepostedat tfirst indicative) and theClosing
Volume (bothmeasured inEUR) and the second term is aweighting factor that gives greaterweight toorders submitted
earlier in the batching period (note that the scheduled batching period duration is 300 s). The variable Early Trading
Interest is designed to increase with auction attractiveness.
Finally, we argue that higher CCA attractiveness should lead to lower indicative price volatility. Traders who trust
the integrity of the market are likely to post their orders earlier in the batching period and to submit larger orders.
Such behavior should make the call auction order book more resilient to liquidity shocks. We define Indicative Price
Volatility as the difference between the highest and lowest indicative prices disseminated during the batching period
(denoted Indicative Pricehigh and Indicative Pricelow , respectively):




− ln (Indicative Pricelow) . (9)
We expect the Indicative Price Volatility to be decreasing with auction attractiveness.
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6 RESULTS
6.1 Closing price efficiency
We investigate whether the reduction in extraordinary volatility carries over to our measure of ETV. According to H1,
the introduction of the CCA extension should reduce transitory volatility. Table 3 shows the event study estimates,
along with standard errors clustered on stocks to adjust for correlation in the cross-section.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show the results for the full sample. The primary coefficient of interest is 𝛽3, which
corresponds toPosti,jTreatmenti,j and captures the effect of the introduction of the volatility extension in the treatment
group relative to the control group. ConsistentwithH1,we obtain negative estimates of 𝛽3 for the transitory volatility,
regardless of whether theMorning Price is defined as a spreadmidpoint or as an average trade price. The estimates for
the ETV based on the midprice version of the Morning Price indicate that the ETV before the introduction is 0.086
(0.096 – 0.010= 0.086) in the treatment group. After the event, the treatment group ETV falls to 0.021 (0.086 – 0.028
– 0.037 = 0.021). The fact that the measures are positive indicates that the closing price is subject to ETV relative to
themorning price. The reduction in ETV, from 0.086 to 0.021, is significant at the 5% level.
The reduction in ETV could potentially be driven by a decrease in overall volatility in the post-event period. We
address this concern in Table 4, in which we present the results of a test of difference in means before and after the
introduction of the extensions for two alternative volatility measures. The High–Low Volatility is the log difference of
the highest and lowest transaction price of the day. TheOpen-to-Close Volatility is the absolute log difference between
the opening and the closing price. The results show that the post-event period is characterized by higher, rather than
lower, levels of volatility for both the treatment and the control groups. Hence, we rule out the explanation that lower
levels of overall volatility in the post-event period are behind the change in ETV and attribute the improvement to the
introduction of the CCA extension.
Another potential concern is that the volatility extension effect could be concentrated to a few stocks where
extraordinary volatility is more common.We address this concern by splitting the sample into Volatile stocks andNon-
volatile stocks. The categorization is based on the average volatility of each stock in the pre-event period, using the
median volatility as cut-off point. The results of the subsample analysis are presented in columns 3–6. In line with our
reasoning above,we find that the decrease in closing price transitory volatility is indeed stronger forVolatile stocks, but
the reduction remains statistically significant in both subsamples. The ETV is reduced by 45% for Volatile stocks and by
17% for Non-volatile stocks. We conclude from this exercise that the reduction in transitory volatility is not isolated to
themost volatile stocks.
6.2 Market integrity
Figure 2 reports the average evolution of the auction cancellation rate (Panel a) and the auction order imbalances
(Panel b) for the small-cap and the mid-cap stocks of our treatment group. The cancellation rate is the EUR value of
orders that are cancelled during a given interval of the batching period, divided by the SEK Closing Volume on the same
stock-day. The order imbalance is defined as the absolute difference between the SEK volumes posted at the best bid
and ask prices at the end of a given interval of the batching period. Both variables aremeasured on a 10-s frequency.
We note a perceptible reduction in both the cancellation rate and the order imbalance toward the end of the auc-
tion. This finding supports the hypothesis of improvedmarket integrity. In particular, the sharp increase in order imbal-
ances in the end of the auction, which is mitigated after the event, is consistent with manipulative strategies.We note
that there are differences between the pre- and post-period observations earlier in the auction too, but as emphasized
above, auction price manipulators have strong incentives to act in the very end of the auction. For this reason, we do
not interpret the earlier fluctuations as variation inmarket integrity.
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TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics on pre/post volatility
Pre-event Post-event
Mean Median Mean Median Difference inmeans t-Statistic
High–Low Volatility
All stocks 0.027 0.024 0.031 0.027 0.004 3.626***
Treatment 0.030 0.027 0.034 0.029 0.004 2.331***
Control 0.024 0.022 0.029 0.025 0.005 2.839***
Open-to-Close Volatility
All stocks 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.014 0.002 2.761***
Treatment 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.015 0.002 1.762***
Control 0.014 0.012 0.016 0.013 0.002 2.134***
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics on two alternative volatility measures for 6 months before the introduction of
CCA extensions (June 1, 2014 to November 30, 2014) and 6 months after the implementation (December 1, 2014 to May
31, 2015).High–Low Volatility is the log difference between the highest and lowest transaction prices of the day.Open-to-Close
Volatility is the absolute log difference of the opening and closing prices. Themean and themedian are computed from thedaily
observations of each variable. The last two columns show the difference in means pre/post the introduction of the extensions
and the significance of the difference in means using a two-tailed Welch t-test with heteroskedastic robust standard errors.
The analysis is conducted for all the stocks of the sample, as well as separately for the treatment and control groups.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
To see whether the conclusions from our visual inspection hold up statistically, we benchmark themarket integrity
variables to the control group. Table 5 presents the results of the difference-in-differences regression analysis onmar-
ket integrity. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are double clustered by stock and day (following Petersen,
2009).17 We find evidence of improvedmarket integrity, consistentwithH2. The variable Late Cancellation Rate, which
captures the cancellation intensity at the end of the batching period, decreases significantly for the treatment group
relative to the control group. The Late Cancellation Rate for the treatment group before the event is 1.120 (0.921 +
0.199 = 1.120), showing that the amount of late cancellations is, on average, slightly higher than the trading volume
in the uncross. Following the introduction of the volatility extension, it falls to 0.968 (1.120 – 0.001 – 0.151= 0.968),
which is a drop of 14%. At the same time, the control group remains unchanged. The drop in cancellations in the last
seconds of the auction indicates that volatility extensions improve the CCA integrity.
Late Order Imbalance captures whether the average order imbalance is larger in the last 10 s than in the rest of the
batching period. For the treatment group before the event, this variable is slightly below 1 (0.928 + 0.045 = 0.973),
indicating that the order imbalance is, on average, lower late in the auction. After the introduction of the extension,
Late Order Imbalance decreases relative to the control group, but the effect is statistically significant only at the 10%
confidence level. The decrease in auction order book imbalance amounts to about 3% (−0.024/0.973 = −0.025) and
indicates a slight improvement in market integrity.
6.3 Auction attractiveness
We now turn to the investigation of H3, stating that extensions make the CCA more attractive to investors, partially
because the increased integrity improves trust in the auction mechanism. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of two mea-
sures of auction attractiveness for stocks at NASDAQ Stockholm. Panel a reports the average evolution of the Indica-
tive Volume available during the batching period before and after the introduction of volatility extensions. The parallel
17 For robustness, we compute the twomarket integrity proxies using alternative times frames. The conclusions are along the lines of the ones obtainedwhen
using 10 s and are found in Section C of the Appendix in the Supporting Information.
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(b)
(a)
F IGURE 2 Measures of market integrity. This figure shows the cancellation rate and order imbalances during the
batching period of the CCA at NASDAQ Stockholm. Panel (a) depicts the SEK value of limit orders (limit price
multiplied by the limit quantity) cancelled in a given period, divided by the SEK Closing Volume on the same stock-day.
The time series is based on a 10-s frequency for the period from 5:25 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. Panel (b) shows the SEKOrder
Imbalance (absolute difference between the bid and ask limit quantities multiplied by their limit prices) at a 10-s
frequency for the period from 5:25 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. Bothmeasures are averaged across stock-days for small- and
mid-cap stocks at NASDAQ Stockholm. The pre-event period (Pre) contains all trading days from June 1 to November
30, 2014. The post-event period (Post) contains all trading days fromDecember 1, 2014 toMay 31, 2015
upward shift of the volume curve shows that the Indicative Volume is higher throughout the batching period after the
volatility extension is introduced. In line with our hypothesis, the evidence suggests that the volatility extension suc-
ceeds in attracting liquidity to the CCA.
Auction attractiveness can also be assessed by looking at the timing of order submissions. If market participants
trust the auction mechanism, they are more likely to submit their orders early in the batching period. Panel b of
Figure 3 depicts the cumulative frequency of the time of the first indicative price, tfirst indicative. The upward shift of
the curve shows that, after the implementation of CCA extensions, the indicative price is established earlier in the
batching period. This finding suggests that traders are less concerned about closing price volatility.
Table 6 presents the results of the difference-in-differences regression analysis for the five measures relating to
auction attractiveness with standard errors (reported in parentheses) double clustered by stock and day. We find
strong evidence of improved auction attractiveness, consistent with H3. In relative terms, the variable Relative Clos-
ing Volume for the treatment group increases following the event. According to the coefficient estimates, the closing
auction volume for the treatment group falls by one percentage point from 5.56% (0.0855 – 0.0299) to 4.56% (0.0556
402 FÉLEZ-VIÑAS AND HAGSTRÖMER


















Adjusted R2 0.01 0.001
Note: This table reports the estimated effects of the introduction of a CCA extension onmarket integrity. The parameter esti-
mates correspond to the following difference-in-differences regression:
Yi,t = 𝛼 + 𝛽1Posti,t + 𝛽2Treatmenti,t + 𝛽3Posti,tTreatmenti,t + 𝛾Controlsi,t + 𝜀i,t ,
where i is an index for stocks and t is an index for trading days. The regression is estimated for two different dependent vari-
ables that capture market integrity: Late Cancellation Rate is the ratio between the EUR volume cancellations occurring in the
last 10 s of the auction and the EUR Closing Volume. Late Order Imbalance is the ratio between the average bid–ask EUROrder
Imbalance of the last 10 s of the batching period and the overall averageOrder Imbalance of the batching period (excluding the
last 10 s). The independent variables are as follows: Treatmenti,t is a dummy variable that indicates whether stock i belongs
to the treatment group (NASDAQ Stockholm); Posti,t is a dummy variable that indicates the post-event window (December
1, 2014 to May 31, 2015); and Controlsi,t is a matrix of control variables including Volatility and Volume, defined as in Table 3.
Standard errors are corrected by double clustering on stock and day and are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
– 0.0206 + 0.0106).18 However, the fall is even greater for the control group, whose closing auction market share
decreases significantly bymore than twopercentage points from8.55% to 6.49%. This result, consistentwith Figure 3,
Panel a, indicates that the volatility extension successfully attracts trading volume to the auction.
Turning to the batching period activity, the metric First Indicative Time to Uncross captures whether investors sub-
mit orders earlier in the CCA.We find that the metric increases by 3.08 s (from 223.86 to 226.94 s) for the treatment
group, a statistically significant improvement relative to the control group (which moves significantly in the opposite
direction). This result is consistent with the idea that CCA volatility extensions increase trader confidence in the auc-
tionmechanism.
The conjecture of increased auction attractiveness is reinforced by the positive and significant results for Indicative
Volume Time to Uncross (which captures whether traders submit orders earlier and of greater volume), Early Trading
Interest (which reflects if a greater fraction of the final traded volume is concentrated at the beginning of the batching
period), and the significantly negative coefficient on Indicative Price Volatility (which indicates the auction’s sensitivity
to liquidity shocks).
Overall, our results show strong support for H3. They are consistent with Domowitz andMadhavan’s (2001) point
that market participants value the possibility of modifying or cancelling orders in the batching period, particularly in
18 We exclude Volume as a control variable for Relative Closing Volume in order to avoid amechanical relation between the two variables.
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(a)
(b)
F IGURE 3 Measures of auction attractiveness. This figure reports auction attractiveness measured during the
batching period of the CCA. Panel (a) depicts the log SEK Indicative Volume at a 20-s frequency for the period from
5:25 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. Themeasure is averaged across stock-days for small- andmid-cap stocks at NASDAQ
Stockholm. Panel (b) shows the cumulative frequency of the time of the first indicative price. The time series has a
10-s frequency for the first minute of the batching period. The pre-event period (Pre) contains all trading days from
June 1 to November 30, 2014. The post-event period (Post) contains all trading days fromDecember 1, 2014 toMay
31, 2015
times of high volatility. The finding that investors post orders earlier in the batching period, that the early orders are of
greater volume, and that the indicative price becomes less volatile indicates that investors become lesswaryof auction
manipulation, as argued by Comerton-Forde and Putnin, š (2014).
7 CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the effects of introducing a volatility extension in the CCA. We use a quasi-natural experiment
setup based on the introduction of a volatility extension at NASDAQ Stockholm to examine the effects of CCA volatil-
ity extensions. Our results show that the (threat of) CCA volatility extensions reduce the incidence of extraordinary
closing price volatility and that transitory volatility at the close is mitigated. Our analysis of the order entry phase
indicates that the underlying mechanism for the effect is an improvement in CCA market integrity, which makes the
mechanismmore attractive to investors.
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Volatility extensions havebeen implemented for closing and reopening auctions following tradinghalts atUSequity
markets in 2017. Furthermore, call auction volatility curbs are strongly advised for all EU exchanges since January
2018. Given the regulatory agenda, we expect increasing interest in volatility extensions. Understanding the effects of
this feature is hence increasingly relevant to regulators and policy makers.
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